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ABSTRACT
A fundamental problem of the theory of oligopoly is the indeter-
minacy of equilibria. Even limiting consideration to reaction function
models, different conjectural variations can result in a plethora of
equilibria. The purpose of this article is to investigate the basic
premise that the various oligopoly model result in an unacceptable
divergence in market equilibria. In the first half of the paper a
theoretical model of a static conjectural variation duopoly with sym-
metric costs is presented. Using this model, we develop and quantify
the concept of the indeterminacy of equilibria. In particular we
define the coefficient of dispersion of equilibria and investigate its
behavior. It turns out that the coefficient of dispersion is solely a
function of the basic conditions of the market—costs and demand. This
result is of empirical significance because it is possible to determine
ex ante based on easily observable information, the extent to which
conjectural variation (market conduct) will influence market equili-
brium. To focus more closely on the empirical importance of this
result, we examine the Western U.S. coal market and compute all of
the well-known duopoly equilibria in this market (Cournot, Bertrand,
Stackelberg, consistent conjectures).
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I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental problem of the theory of oligopoly is the indeter—
minancy of equilibria. By changing the assumptions made about the
actions, interactions and strategies of firms, numerous market equi-
libria can be generated, ranging from pure monopoly to marginal cost
pricing. There is a long history of attempts to narrow the set of
plausible equilibria, with two significant recent developments.
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Bresnahan (1981) and Laitner (1980) have proposed new and supposedly
superior models where each firm acts with full information about the
strategies and actions of opponents. Bresnahan has shown that with
modest restrictions on marginal cost and demand functions, such behav-
ioral assumptions result in a unique static equilibrium. Another
development has been in the applied economics literature where several
authors (Iwata, 1974; Appelbaum, 1978; Just and Chern, 1980) have
sought to econometrically determine, for specific markets, the beliefs
held by firms about their opponents in those markets.
The purpose of this article is to investigate the basic premise
that the various oligopoly models result in an unacceptable divergence
in market equilibria. The question we address here is how the diver-
gence of equilibria is affected by (a) the basic conditions of the
market (costs and demand); and (b) the conduct of the market (the con-
jectural variations each firm holds with respect to its opponents).
The general conclusion of our analysis is that conjectural variations
are of secondary importance in determining market equilibria. The
empirical significance of this is that a great deal can be understood
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about a market through costs and demand, without information on conjec-
tural variations. We also show that, by appropriate selection of a
decision variable, the importance of knowing the conjectural variation
can be further reduced.
We first examine the indeterminancy of equilibria from a theoretical
perspective, using a static conjectural variation duopoly model assuming
symmetric costs for the two firms. Using this model we define a measure
of the indeterminacy, the coefficient of dispersion , as the ratio of
the dispersion of the noncooperative conjectural variation duopoly
equilibria relative to all plausible equilibria in the two-firm case.
The coefficient of dispersion has several desirable properties, including
a sole dependence on the relative slope of the demand and marginal cost
functions in the market. Other properties of the coefficient of disper-
sion and the duopoly model in general are also developed.
The second part of the paper takes a closer look at the divergence
of equilibria through an empirical analysis of a major natural resource
market. We examine the market for Western U.S. coal where two producing
regions (Montana and Wyoming) dominate production and appear to exer-
cise market power. We find that in this market, the various duopoly
equilibria are quite clustered. We also discover some empirically
appealing properties of the Bresnahan/Laitner oligopoly equilibrium.
In the empirical analysis we introduce a new decision variable,
intermediate between quantity and price, which is a more relevant con-
trol variable to our duopolists. The decision variable we consider is
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the markup over marginal cost. For most duopoly markets this decision
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variable has appealing characteristics which should give more realistic
results than output quantities (the traditional decision variables) or
price (the problematic decision variable suggested by Bertrand). We
calculate the standard conjectural variation equilibria with this deci-
sion variable to both expand our menu of duopoly solutions and also to
examine the empirical properties of this new decision variable. In
doing so, we are able to characterize the differences in market perfor-
mance when quantities and markups are used as the decision variable and
thus indicate when one may be a better choice than the other.
II. BACKGROUND
In contrast to the case of perfect competition, oligopoly theory
is plagued by a plethora of theories for explaining the equilibria that
result when a few firms interact (see Friedman, 1977, 1983). The
oldest and probably the most common class of oligopoly models consists
of the conjectural variation models. This class consists of the true
dynamic models in which firms dynamically interact, reacting to each
other's moves. Each firm's reaction function defines the way the firm
reacts to its rivals. Such models are appropriately called reaction
function models but the same term is also frequently used for the
static conjectural variation models, such as originally developed by
Cournot. With no dynamic interaction, it is a little difficult to
describe the static models in terms of reacting to opponents' actions.
However, this does not detract from the substance of the static models.
In the same way that much can be learned from static general equili-
brium models, static conjectural variation models are useful, to a
large extent because of their simplicity.
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A. Static vs. Dynamic Models
In both the static and dynamic models, each firm (i) has a quasi-
concave profit function, tt
.
(x) , which depends on the actions of all
firms (x). Firm i maximizes profits by setting his action, x
, to
satisfy the first-order condition
V^-^-0 (1)
3x
assuming an interior solution. It is in the vector -— that the first
o X
,
static-dynamic ambiguity arises. For j * i, the firm hypothesizes the
value of 3x./3x.. This is the firm's conjectural variation with
J i
respect to its opponents. Firm i conjectures how firm j will change
its decision variable (eg, output or price) in response to a small
change in firm i's decision variable. Let firm i's conjecture about
3x./3x. be r... If r. . is viewed as a response, then a multi-period
interaction among the firms is implied. Viewing r. . as i's conjecture
of how firm j decides upon x. is consistent with a static model. Sub-
stituting r. . into equation (1) yields
3tt 3-rr.
r-^ + I v.. -± = (2)
3x. ,. ii 3x.
A Nash equilibrium is the vector _x (and there may be more than one)
which simultaneously satisfies eqn. (2) for all oligopolists. In the
static conjectural variation model, as in the static competitive
equilibrium model, we are not concerned with the process for moving to
an equilibrium, we are only concerned with the equilibrium.
A second static-dynamic abiguity arises when eqn. (2) is rewritten
as
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X = f (X-, • •., X
-{_]» Xi+1 » •*•»
X
n » JLi' (3)
for the case of n oligopolists, where r. is the vector of firm i's con-
jectural variations. Clearly a Nash equilibrium is also a solution to
the n equations of the form of eqn. (3). However, eqn. (3) is usually
termed firm i's reaction or best-reply function, indicating firm i's
best reply to the action of all the other firms. However, in a true
static model firm i never sees the actions of its opponents until after
it has made its move. The notion of reacting to opponent's actions is
purely a dynamic phenomenon. Writing eqn. (2) in the form of eqn. (3)
in a static model is perfectly correct; it is only in terming eqn. (3)
a reaction function that the ambiguity arises.
In this paper we will follow the extremely common but misleading
practice of dealing with static conjectural variation models in terms
of reaction functions of the form of equation (3). As we have noted
above, provided one does not incorrectly interpret the word "reaction
function," this approach is entirely correct.
B. Static Conjectural Variation Models
Having defined static conjectural variation models, we now turn
to the specific static models of Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand and
Bresnahan (or Laitner). The only difference among these oligopoly
models is the presumed conjectural variation.
On the continuum of possible assumptions about conjectural vari-
ations, extreme behavior is associated with the naive models of Cournot
and Bertrand. Without loss of generality, let quantity be the decision
variable and let us now restrict ourselves to duopoly. In the Cournot
-6-
inodel, a firm presumes opponents will not respond to changes in the
firm's output (zero conjectural variation). The original Bertrand
model is based on a zero conjectural variation with price as the deci-
sion variable. In the case where goods are perfect substitutes and
marginal costs are constant, each firm assumes any attempt to raise
prices will result in a total abandonment of the market to the other
firm. This description can be translated to the case where quantity
is the decision variable. Each firm assumes that any attempt to exer-
cise market power by reducing output will be totally foiled by an
equivalent increase in output by its opponent (conjectural variation
of -1). This assumption implies that at a Nash equilibrium, producers
will price at marginal cost if the goods are perfect substitutes. Both
the Bertrand and Cournot models assume very simple behavior of oppo-
nents.
The recently proposed consistent (or rational) conjectures equilib-
rium (Bresnahan, 1981; Laitner, 1979) involves the other extreme of
availability of information about opponents. Each firm has rational
expectations (perfect foresight) regarding conjectural variations and
thus acts with full knowledge of the actual reaction functions of oppo-
nents. Thus, in equilibrium, the assumed conjectural variations are in
fact the slopes of opponents' reaction functions. The consistent con-
jectures equilibrium (CCE) has some desirable properties relative to
the other models. The other models fall prey to the criticism that
although each firm is on its best-reply function, this best-reply out-
put is "right for the wrong reasons" (Feliner 1949). Each firm's best-
reply is based on an incorrect perception of its opponent's behavior.
-7-
For a CCE the assumption one makes about opponent behavior is the same
as actual opponent behavior in equilibrium—one is "right for the right
reasons." However, because of its use of a reaction function, the CCE
4
is stretching the limits of the static model. To be correct, dynam-
ics should really be explicitly introduced (see Cyert and DeGroot, 1970)
Intermediate between the two informational extremes of the CCE and
the Cournot or Bertrand models is the Stackelberg model which posits
an information asymmetry among the duopolists. One oligopolist acts
naively as a Cournot oligopolist. The other duopolist, a leader, acts
with full knowledge of the reaction function of its opponent.
All of these models involve conjectural variations (with quantity
as the decision variable) between and -1. Obviously, a continuum of
oligopoly models can be generated by presuming different conjectural
variations between and -1. Each, of course, will generally result in
a different market equilibrium.
The markup decision variable introduced in this paper avoids some
of the ambiguity regarding conjectural variation. In many markets,
including the Western U.S. coal market examined here, the assumption of
zero conjectural variation in markup (tax rate) space appears to be
very realistic. Markups tend to be relatively constant over time (as
opposed to quantities or prices) and, in the standard oligopoly situa-
tion, are difficult if not impossible to observe for one's opponents.
To observe markup, it is necessary to know one's opponents' cost struc-
ture. Further, a zero conjectural variation in terms of markup is
equivalent to some nonzero conjectural variation in terras of quantities,
suggesting behavior intermediate between the Cournot and Bertrand
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models. Thus, by selecting a decision variable that shows little
empirical temporal variation, such as per cent markup over marginal
cost, an assumption of zero conjectural variation for these variables
is a very useful way of partially avoiding Fellner's criticism of the
Cournot duopoly equilibria.
III. THE DIVERGENCE OF DUOPOLY EQUILIBRIA
The basic question of this paper is how divergent are the equili-
bria from the various conjectural variation duopoly models. We answer
this question in this section by examining the range of output asso-
ciated with noncooperative duopoly relative to all possible economi-
cally meaningful output levels. We focus on a simple static conjectural
variation model of duopoly where both firms have identical costs and
produce identical products. However, to assess the effect of conjec-
tural variation on equilibria, we allow the firms to have different
conjectural variations.
Before considering the potential output levels associated with non-
cooperative duopoly, consider the potential output levels in a two-firm
market, for any market conduct assumption. The economically meaningful
set of output levels are those where each firm prices at or above mar-
ginal cost (even then, profits may be negative but we will ignore this).
Furthermore, output levels below the contract curve (the curve asso-
ciated with cooperative behavior) can be excluded since movement from
such- levels to the contract curve makes both producers and consumers
better off. Consequently the region of meaningful output levels lies
between the contract curve and the output curve associated with margi-
nal cost pricing. Within this region lie the levels of output associated
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with the usual models of noncooperative duopoly. The important ques-
tion to ask is what is the potential dispersion of output levels from
various noncooperative duopoly models relative to the overall possible
dispersion of output levels.
We first define the set of models of noncooperative static duopoly.
We argue that it is reasonable to define this set as the set of con-
jectural variation equilibria where each firm's conjectural variation
lies between and -1. Extremes of industry output are associated
with the Cournot and "Bertrand" duopoly (conjectural variations of
and -1 , respectively). As mentioned before, with identical goods, the
Bertrand duopoly is equivalent to marginal cost pricing and thus is
associated with maximum output. A conjectural variation below -1
implies pricing below marginal cost. Thus -1 is a natural lower bound
on the conjectural variation. Lower output is associated with a con-
jectural variation of zero. As Bresnahan (1981) argues, a conjectural
variation greater than zero implies a form of collusion. A firm con-
jectures that as it lowers its output, its opponent will do likewise.
Thus zero is a plausible upper limit on conjectural variation. All of
the other duopoly models (including the consistent conjectures model)
involve conjectural variations between these extremes.
We examine a market for a homogeneous good with an inverse demand
function P(q, + q^)"-
?(q
x
+ q 2
) = a + b(
q;L
+ q 2
). (3)
Assume b < 0. There are two producing firms in this market, each with
identical production costs, given by
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Q
C(q.) = C
Q
+ C
iq
.
+—- q.
2
(4)
with C
, C. > and a > C,.
Profits for the ith firm are thus given by
Q
7T. = [a + b(q. + q
<i> )]q i - CQ - Ciq .
- y- q.
2
(5)
where <i> denotes the other firm. First-order profit maximizing con-
ditions are
u. = a + b(q
t
+
q<i> )
+ bq.(l + r.) - C
±
- C
2qi
< (6)
q . > 0, u.q. = 0,
l — 11
where r is the firm i's conjectural variation: Sq^.v/Bq. , conjec-
tured. Since CL > 0, eqn. (6) can be rewritten as
w
±
= + [ a(2 + r
±
) - 1^ + aq
<jL>
< 0, q. > 0, w.q. = (7)
b
a " C
l
where a =
-pr~ and S = — •
L
2
L
2
Note that a is negative and 8 is positive. Assuming an interior solu-
tion to equation (7) for both firms, the Nash equilibrium can be easily
computed:
k 0[1 - a(l + r,..)]
q
x
=
—
2 '
(8)
[a(2 + r
±
) - l][a(2 + r<i> ) - 1] - a
It is now possible to derive the earlier statements that maximum output
is associated with the Bertrand equilibrium and minimum output with the
Cournot equilibrium. This result is embodied in the following proposi-
tion:
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Prop. 1 : Assunilng a quadratic duopoly model with identical cost
structures for the two firms, the equilibrium output for each firm
is monotone with respect to each of the conjectural variations:
* *
3q. 3q.
i <i>
Proof : The proof follows directly from differentiating equation (8):
3q * -0[1 - a(l + r )]a[a(2 + r ) - 1]
dr
i [a(2 + r.) - l][a(2 + r.. s ) - 1] - a }1 l <i> J
Since by assumption a < 0, 6 > and -1 \_ r <_ 0, the above expression
*
is negative. Similarly the sign of can be shown to be positive.
9r
<i>
Q.E.D.
Thus output for each firm is greater under a Bertrand model than
under a Cournot model, holding the other firm's conjectural variation
constant. However, the proposition implies that maximum output for
firm i is associated with r
±
=
-1, r
<±>
= and similarly minimum out-
put is associated with r. = 0, r... = -1.
The result is shown in Figure 1 for the case of a = -1. The
scatter of points in the figure is the set of Nash equilibria asso-
ciated with 1000 randomly selected pairs of conjectural variations (r..
,
r
2 ), each element of which is chosen from an independent uniform distri-
bution over [-1,0]. As we have argued, the region represents the set
of possible non-cooperative equilibria. By comparing the size of the
region with the size of the region of nonnegative output between ABCDE
(maximum output) and GH (the contract curve) a measure of the extent
of cluster of the non-cooperative equilibria can be developed.
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Defn ; Define the coefficient of dispersion, a, as
the ratio of the area (in q. - q2 space) of the set
of noncooperative equilibria to the area of the set
of economically feasible equilibria, bounded by the
contract curve and the marginal cost pricing curve.
For Figure 1, with a -1, the coefficient of dispersion, a, is
equal to approximately 17%. This means that of the total area between
the contract curve and the maximum output curve, only 17% corresponds
to noncooperative equilibria.
The coefficient of dispersion, a, has two interesting properties.
One is that it is independent of 3. Only the relative slopes of the
marginal cost and demand function (a) determine a. Further, a is mono-
tone in a, increasing as a becomes larger in absolute value, approaching
a limiting value of 4/9:
Prop 2 ; Assuming a quadratic duopoly model with identical cost
structures for the two firms and conjectural variations between
-1 and 0, then the coefficient of dispersion, a, is monotone
increasing in the absolute value of a (the relative slope of the
demand and marginal cost functions, b/CL) approaching a limiting
value of 4/9 as a approaches minus infinity.
Proof : See appendix.
Figure 2 indicates the behavior of a as a function of a, the rela-
tive slope of the marginal cost and demand functions. Two cases would
lead to a maximum value of a: steeply sloped demand or a shallowly
-13-
sloped marginal cost function. On the other hand, the dispersion will
be small if demand is shallowly sloped (highly price sensitive) or
marginal cost is steeply sloped (rapidly rising marginal costs).
The significance of this result is that one can tell the importance
of the conjectural variation in determining a duopoly equilibrium
solely on the basis of observable characteristics of the market; it is
not necessary to observe the conjectural variation. Thus this result
has empirical utility, since costs and demand relations are much
easier to observe than market conduct.
IV. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DUOPOLY
The principal purpose of this section is to examine the clustering
of duopoly equilibria in an empirical setting. There are several
reasons for this. In an empirical setting, we can examine a larger
variety of duopoly models than is readily possible in the theoretical
analysis. We can explore criteria other than total output (e.g., unit
profit) as measures of the clustering of equilibria. We can also quan-
tify, for an actual market, the extent to which the equilibria asso-
ciated with the various models actually diverge. Finally, we can
explore the performance of markup over marginal cost as a decision
variable.
The market we examine is the Western U.S. coal market. In a pre-
vious paper (Kolstad and Wolak, 1983), we developed an empirical model
of this market. That model will serve as the basis for this analysis.
The market is dominated by two states, Wyoming and Montana. Each of
these states possesses substantial market power because of large reserves
of desirable (low sulfur) and inexpensively extractable coal. This coal
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is by far the cheapest in the U.S. to produce (excluding low quality
lignite) and even after significant transport costs are added, competes
very favorably in distant raidwestern and southern U.S. markets. The
popularity of coal from these two states has caused a rapid increase in
its production over the last decade and the imposition of substantial
6
severance taxes.
We assume that these two states act as duopolists even though there
may be many producers in each state. Each state is in a position to
intercede between producers and consumers, taxing at any level it
wishes, coal which is sold. The two states have the market power and
are thus duopolists. The duopolists interact with a competitive fringe
of producing states and thus face a residual demand curve. The two
states are assumed to act to maximize tax revenues where the tax is
expressed a fractional markup over marginal production cost. We exa-
mine the conventional duopoly models of Cournot, Stackelberg, and the
CCE. In order to expand this menu of models somewhat, we examine these
models from the perspective of tax rate as the decision variable as
well as output quantity as the decision variable. Of course a par-
ticular conjectural variation where tax rate is the decision variable
can be translated into a conjectural variation where quantity is the
decision variable.
Tax rate is an obvious decision variable in the case of severance
taxation. However, if the tax rate is viewed as a per cent markup over
cost, its applicability becomes more general. In many cases, oligop-
olistic firms do seem conscious of the percentage markup over cost of
their product and in many cases utilize that value as the operable
-In-
variable in their maximization decision. Also, for most oligopolistic
environments, institutional and political factors make the optimal
setting of quantity very difficult. In these cases, optimally setting
markup and satisfying demand at that markup level is far more tractable.
Further, it would appear that the level of the markup remains relatively
constant over time, particularly for the Western U.S. coal market sug-
8
gesting the appropriateness of a zero conjectural variation in markup.
In the next section of the paper we develop the various duopoly
models in a general framework and discuss the equilibria associated
with the several models. We then present the results of the analysis
and discuss the clustering of the various equilibria.
A. Duopoly Equilibria
The market we examine consists of two states that produce a homo-
geneous good and are separated from a single aggregate consumer. Each
individual producer falls under a single political jurisdiction and
therefore will be aggregated into one of the producing states. For the
i producing state, we denote q., t., t. and S.(q.) as, respectively,
the output, tax rate (as a fraction, to be applied to marginal cost),
per unit transport cost from producers to consumers and the marginal
cost function for production of the good. Let the inverse demand func-
tion be denoted by P(Z q.).
:
J
1. Quantity as the Decision Variable . We first consider the
classic quantity-based duopoly models. In such cases, the state
restricts output through the sale of export licenses or through some
other device in order to maximize the monopoly rents accruing to the
state. The objective function for each state is:
-lb-
Max q.[P(Z q.) " S.(q.) - r ], Vi (11)
1 . 1 11 1
The first order conditions for this maximization (assuming positive
output) are
HZ q ) " S (q ) - t + q i {P'(Z q.)(l + r.) - Sj(q )} = 0, Vi (12)
J J
9q
<i> u .th , . .The terra r. = — represents the l state s conjectural variation
l 9q.
l
with respect to the other state (<i>). Note that because of the form
of the objective function, a conjectural variation of -1 does not result
in marginal cost pricing unless marginal costs are constant.
We can solve these first order conditions to determine reaction
functions which give each q. in terms of the other state's output
level, q^.^j and the i state's conjectural variation, r.:
q. = R. (q/. N , r.
)
M i Xi> i
Given values of r. for each state, we then have two equations in two
unknown quantities. These reaction functions can be solved to obtain
the duopoly equilibrium.
It is precisely the value of r. assumed that determines the dif-
ferent equilibria. For the case of the Cournot equilibrium the conjec-
tural variations are assumed to be zero (i.e., r. = 0, Vi). The
Stackelberg equilibrium is a bit more difficult to characterize in this
framework. Assume one state (i) is the leader and the other state (<i>)
is the follower. We first determine the Cournot reaction function for
the follower by assuming r, .. = 0. Given this reaction function we then
calculate its derivative with respect to the leader's output, q. . This
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derivative is set equal to the leader's conjectural variation, r. . The
reaction function for the leader state can then be calculated which in
turn permits the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium.
The other equilibrium concept we will consider is the consistent
conjectures equilibrium (CCE). In this case each firm's (i) conjectural
variation (r.) is equal to the derivative of the other firm's (<i>)
reaction function with respect to q.. This condition allows us to
completely determine all r. and thus solve for a CCE. It should be
pointed out that in the case of the CCE, we assume a constant conjec-
tural variation, independent of output levels (as does Bresnahan,
9
1981). Thus, we make a linear approximation to a duopolist's conjec-
ture about its opponent's reaction function.
2. Markup (Tax rate) as the Decision Variable . Using the same
basic framework, we can calculate oligopoly equilibria based on frac-
tional markup over marginal cost, or in our specific case, a tax rate:
P(E q.) - S.(q.) - t.
• J 11 l
t. = —J =-7—v . (13)
l S. (q.
)
l l
The market equilibrium for a given set of taxes is determined by
(1 + t.)S.(q.) + T. = P(E q.), Vi (14)ill l
-J
Because there are many producers within a state, the market price net
of tax will be marginal cost, S.(q.). Thus, Eq. (14) states that the
producer prices (including tax) plus transport cost must equal the
price to consumers.
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For the purposes of tax equilibrium, we assume that each producing
state i seeks to maximize tax revenues given the boundary equilibrium
conditions (14). The simultaneous solution of the first order con-
ditions for this maximization and the equilibrium conditions results
in a set of tax reaction functions giving a state's tax rate (t.) as a
function of the other state's tax rate (t..v) and state i's conjectural
variation:
t, - T.Ct^, r
t
). (15)
This approach can be taken for each state yielding a tax reaction func-
tion such as Eq. (15) for each jurisdiction. This results in a set of
equations in the same number of unknowns as tax rates, which can then
be solved for a set of equilibrium tax rates as a function of the con-
jectural variations. Computation of the simple Nash (zero conjectural
variation), Stackelberg and consistent conjectures equilibria follow
the discussion of the previous section where quantity was the decision
variable.
B. The Empirical Model
We are now ready to proceed to the actual empirical analysis of a
duopoly. As mentioned earlier, we will treat two states, Montana and
Wyoming, as duopolists. For our purposes we will treat these states as
if they sell coal at a single, distant demand center (e.g., the "mid-
west") .
In previous work (Kolstad and Wolak, 1983) we presented an
econometric model of this market. To summarize, a large and detailed
spatial equilibrium model of the U.S. coal market was used to generate
-19-
"pseudo-data" which were then used to estimate a simple model of the
market, as described in the previous section. The model consists of
five linear equations: a single demand function, two marginal cost
(net of tax) functions for coal produced in the two states and two
transport cost functions indicating the cost of moving coal from each
of the states to the demand center. Transport costs (per unit) are
assumed to be a function of the mine-mouth price of the coal
(including tax), principally to capture the effect that as coal price
goes up, a producer's market area shrinks, thus reducing average
transport costs. Thus the model is quite similar in structure to that
discussed in the previous section. For further information on the
12
model, the reader is referred to Kolstad and Wolak (1983).
V. RESULTS
Given the estimated model of the Western U.S. coal market, we can
proceed to compute the various duopoly equilibria. For each model, and
for each state, we examine equilibrium output, the tax rate necessary
to support the equilibrium and resulting severance tax revenues. For
reference, we have also computed these variables for the zero tax rate
situation as well as collusion in tax setting. The collusive situation
results in a variety of outcomes (the contract curve), which depend on
the weight given to revenue from each of the states.
Table I presents the output, tax rates and revenue associated with
the various equilibria. These data are presented graphically in Figs.
3 and 4. Figure 3 shows the feasible region for output levels for the
two states. Shown in the figure is the line of maximum output, assuming
taxes cannot be negative. In Fig. 3, the band between the origin and
-20-
the maximum output line represents the region of nonnegative outputs.
This region can be further restricted by assuming that output levels
in the region between the origin and the contract curve are unlikely
since the contract curve represents maximum producer power and produ-
cers are assumed to behave rationally. Consumers and producers could
be made better off by moving to the contract curve from its interior.
Also shown in this figure is output associated with the various
duopoly models, keyed to the case number in Table I. Furthermore, the
broken line in the Figure represents the boundary of the set of non-
cooperative equilibria where both conjectural variations lie between
-1 and 0. Figure 4 shows the feasible region for tax rates for the two
states. Although any tax rate can be set, by assuming profit maximiza-
tion the region between this line and the origin represents plausible
values for tax rates, by the same arguments as were used for Fig. 3.
Tax rates associated with the various duopoly equilibria are also shown,
The same pattern occurs in the two figures. For a given decision
variable the equilibria are very close together and regardless of the
decision variable, the equilibria are still quite clustered when viewed
relative to the set of possible or plausible outcomes. This clustering
can be quantified by looking at the entire set of equilibria as the
conjectural variation for each state ranges through the values between
-1 and 0. The boundaries of the set of duopoly equilibria with quan-
tities as the decision variable are shown by the broken line in Figures
3-4. In both figures the set of duopoly equilibria is a significant
but modest subset of possible tax rates or output quantities. As was
mentioned earlier, due to the form of the tax objective (eq. 11), a
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conjectural variation of -1 for both states does not quite correspond
to marginal cost pricing. This is clear from Figure 3.
Consider Figure 3, which is the empirical analog of Figure 1.
Plausible output levels lie between the contract curve and the maximum
output frontier. The region of duopoly equilibria is enclosed by the
broken line. The area of this region is such to give a coefficient of
dispersion of a a 15%. Of the overall plausible region of equilibria,
only 15% is associated with noncooperative duopoly. And as can be
seen, a significantly smaller region corresponds to the specific
duopoly models considered in this paper. How does a a of 15% corres-
pond to the predictions of the theory developed earlier in the paper?
Unfortunately, the empirical model differs somewhat from the theoreti-
cal model, principally in terras of differing (rather than identical)
cost structures and slightly different objectives (e.g., eq. 5 vs. eq.
11) for the two duopolists. The ratios of the slope of the demand and
marginal cost functions (a) are 1.76 for Wyoming and 12.3 for Montana.
From Figure 2, this would imply a a between .2 and .4, a somewhat
higher figure that in actuality. In general, a high a for Montana
would lead one to expect a larger variation in output levels for the
state than for Wyoming. This is in fact confirmed by inspection of
Figure 3. The equilibrium output levels for Montana cover a range of
about 300 million tons per year compared to a similar value of about
200 million tons per year for Wyoming.
Turn now to Figure 4 where the equilibrium tax rates are shown.
Note that when Montana uses a conjectural variation of -1, its tax rate
drops significantly to less than 10%. Although it cannot be totally
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inferred from the figure, this drop-off occurs very rapidly. For
r = -.7, the Montana tax rate is 23% with r = -1 and 32% for r = 0.
m ww
As one moves only slightly away from the -1 conjectural variation,
equilibrium tax rates rise appreciably.
Now let us examine the specific duopoly models enumerated in Table
I. By closer inspection of the diagrams one can see that in all cases
but the CCE, the tax-based duopoly equilibria are further from the
contract curve than the quantity based-solutions. This simply means
that the duopolists in the tax-based case are more conscious of the
effect of their own behavior on their rival's behavior. This recogni-
tion effectively reduces producer power. Thus, the markup or tax-based
equilibrium represents an attractive intermediate structure between the
unrealistically competitive marginal cost pricing and the highly non-
competitive Cournot model.
Note that the consistent conjectures equilibrium is largely invar-
iant to the decision variable used. On reflection, it is easy to see
that both of the solutions should be the same, because both require
full knowledge of the opponent's behavior. Consequently, we would
expect that the same amount of information about one's opponent, regard-
less of the decision variable used, would yield the same market outcome.
However, it is interesting to note that for the quantity based CCE
more information is known about one's opponent than in the markup based
CCE. For the quantity based equilibrium, the CCE is global because the
slope of the opponent's reaction function is everywhere equal to the
other player's conjectural variation. For the tax-based equilibrium
this is true only in a small neighborhood of the CCE. Thus, for the
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tax-based solution each player has knowledge only of the first order
properties of the other's reaction function, whereas for the quantity
based equilibrium, each has complete knowledge of the other's reaction
function. We can see that the additional information associated with
the quantity based CCE results in a slightly more competitive solution
than the tax-based case. In this instance we can see that more correct
information about one's opponent leads to a more competitive outcome.
This invariance of equilibria with respect to the instrument used
does not carry over to the other types of duopoly equilibria. Never-
theless, certain characteristics of the cluster of the oligopoly solu-
tions is invariant to the instrument chosen. Both sets of equilibria
display the characteristic that when one state is a leader its market
position relative to its opponents increases when compared to the
Cournot and CCE equilibria.
Another interesting feature of the consistent conjectures solution
is that it is an outlier for equilibria under both sets of decision
variables. In the case of the quantity based decision variable, the
CCE is the solution furthest from the contract curve, so in a sense, an
outer bound for that set of equilibria. For the tax-based equilibria,
the consistent conjectures solution is the closest to the contract
curve, and therefore is an inner bound for this set of solutions.
This leads to another point about the set of oligopoly equilibria.
In the case of the markup decision variable, we can see that as more
information is utilized about one's opponent's reaction functions,
duopoly equilibria become closer to the contract curve. Arranged
in order of increasing information utilized, are the Nash-Cournot,
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Stackelberg, and then the CCE. The justification for this ordering
is that the Nash-Cournot model assumes nothing about one's opponent's
costs or behavior. The Stackelberg model assumes that the leader knows
the reaction function of the follower, but that the follower know
nothing about the leader's strategy. Finally, it is easy to see that
the CCE requires the most information.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
For the quantity based equilibria more information has the oppo-
site impact. In this case, we see that increases in information lead
to more competitive market outcomes (i.e., further from the contract
curve). We can conclude that regardless of the decision variable, as
more and more information about an opponent's strategy is utilized all
of these noncooperative equilibria approach the consistent conjectures
solution.
What interpretation should be given to these results in terms of
actual and potential behavior of Montana and Wyoming in levying
severance taxes on coal? First of all, it would appear that even
though both states may produce approximately the same amount of coal,
Wyoming has more market power. Since both states face the same demand
curve, that difference must be due to different cost structures in the
two states.
Also, the range of possible duopoly equilibria is significant but
moderate. Tax rates for Wyoming are generally between 30% and 65%
whereas Montana's rates are between 10% and b5%. The consistent con-
jectures equilibrium seems to be an approximate median for the specific
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duopoly models considered, yielding tax rates and output levels inter-
mediate between the extremes of the two Nash-Cournot models. The con-
sistent conjecture equilibria with output as the decision variable
yields taxes of (t , t ) = (.35, .44) which is very close to actual
m w
rates for Montana (33%) but somewhat high for Wyoming (compare to 17%).
Thus tax rates may go higher than at present, based on this model of
the tax-setting process. See Kolstad and Wolak (1984) for a different
view on this issue.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this paper is to investigate the variation in equilibria
that results from different assumptions about market conduct within a
conjectural variation duopoly model. We have derived two basic sets of
results.
At the theoretical level we have developed a measure of the spread
of duopoly equilibria, the coefficient of dispersion, a. We have shown
that this coefficient is dependent only on the relative slopes of the
demand and marginal cost curves. Further, a is monotonically increasing
in this relative slope. No dispersion (a = 0) is associated with per-
fectly elastic demand or perfectly inelastic marginal costs. Maximal
dispersion (a = 4/9) is associated with perfectly inelastic demand or
constant marginal costs.
The results regarding the coefficient of dispersion are particularly
important for empirical work. The fact that market conduct is so dif-
ficult to observe has lead to significant problems in understanding
duopolistic markets. However, as was shown, it is observable character-
istics of the market (costs and demands) which determine the importance
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of the conjectural variation in the realized equilibria. If the market
is such that a is low, then it is relatively unimportant to try to
measure the conjectural variation in that market.
These results we confirmed in our empirical analysis of the western
U.S. coal market. While we argued that the states of Montana and
Wyoming are effectively duopolists in this market, we were unable to
argue for a particular market conduct model. However, in generating
the equilibria associated with a variety of market conduct assump-
tions, we were able to significantly narrow the range of possible
equilibria. Using the coefficient of dispersion measure developed
in the first part of the paper, possible noncooperative equilibria
constitute only 15% of all possible equilibria. And if the extreme
cases of Montana's conjectural variation being near -1 are rejected,
then the spread of possible equilibria shrinks even further. For the
cases of the eight specific duopoly models considered in the paper,
there appeared to be a tendency for the equilibria to cluster about the
consistent conjecture equilibria, suggesting that the consistent con-
jectures equilibrium is a good choice when there is no a priori infor-
mation about market conduct.
Our results also reveal several characteristics of the markup based
oligopoly equilibrium. We can see from the results that this solution
concept with zero conjectural variation is close to the CCE. In cases
where there may not be a unique CCE solution or a CCE is not well
defined (Robson, 1983), this type solution represents a very attractive
(and computationally tractable) alternative. This solution concept is
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preferred for oligopolistic markets where competitors recognize the
effect their decision has on their opponents but have very little
information about the reaction function of their opponents. The tra-
ditional quantity-based analysis is better suited for cases when com-
petitors are not nearly as conscious of each other's effect on one
another.
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2
A number of other authors have recently proposed or discussed
similar models [Ulph (1982); Kamien and Schwartz (1981); Capozza and
van Order (1979)].
3
This decision variable has a long history in the theory of imper-
fect competition. To quote Joan Robinson (1969, p. vii): "Prices are
formed by setting a gross margin, in terras of a percentage on prime
costs."
4
Laitner (1980) discusses the limited "rationality" of the con-
sistent conjectures equilibrium in the static context.
In the rest of this paper, we use the term Bertrand equilibrium
to refer to the case where quantity is the decision variable and the
conjectural variation is -1 . This may not always be the same as the
original Bertrand model.
Tax rates (including property taxes) in both states are in terms
of a per cent of the price (net of tax), FOB mine. The 1982 rate in
Montana for surface coal was 33%; the rate in Wyoming was 17%
(Blackstone 1982).
In retail establishments, for example, prices are often set
through a fixed percent markup over costs (Scherer 1980).
o
Of course, just because a zero conjectural variation seems reason-
able does not mean that the slope of opponents' reaction functions will
be zero which would be required for consistency.
9
Bresnahan (1981) has shown that in a linear model such as this
with quantity as the decision variable, then a constant conjectural
variation involves no approximation at all.
More details on this derivation may be found in our earlier paper
(Kolstad and Wolak, 1983).
The assumption of linearity is principally to lessen the already
sizeable computational burden to calculate equilibria in the markup
case, although the data appear to fit a linear model reasonably well.
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12
The markup model only was developed in Kolstad and Wolak (1983).
However, the quantity model can be easily developed using the coeffi-
cients presented in our earlier paper and the model of eqs. 11-13 in
this paper. This results in the following expressions to be maximized
(eq. 11):
it = q [10.426 - .01781q - .Ul647q Jmm m w
tt = q [10.569 - .01835q - .01l7lq ]
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APPENDIX
Proof of Prop 2 :
Define the areas under the maximum output curve and contract curves
as M and C, respectively. Define the area of the region of duopoly
equilibria as D. Clearly a = D/(M - C). The areas of D and C can be
easily computed using the coordinates of the various vertices as shown
in Fig. 1. These coordinates result from a simple application of eq.
(8) and Prop. 1:
A2
Area of D = —
r
(A_1 )
(a - 3a + 1)(1 - 3a)
g
2
Area of M = -r\ w ., r— (A-2)CI - ZaKl "" a)
The contract curve is slightly more complicated to derive. It is
defined maximizing producer i's profits subject to producer <i> being
at a constant profit level
C
2 2
[a + b(q
t
+ q
<i> )]q i " c " Ci q i " J" q i (A-3a)V q<i>
C
2 2
s.t. [a + b(q. + q
<;L>
)]q
<;L>
' % ' ^<±> ' J~ \±> = ^0 (A"3b)
q., q<i>
> (A-3c)
First order conditions for this maximization, assuming both producers
are at positive output levels are
a + b(q. +
q<i> )
+ bq
t
- C
±
- C
2
q. + Xbq<i>
= (A-4a)
-A2-
bq. + X[a + b(q. + q ) + bq,. s - C. - C_q... ] = (A-4b)1 1 <i> <i> 1 2 <i>
These two equations can be reduced to
[(2a - l)q. + aq.. N + 6H(2a - Dq.. N + aq . + g] - a
2
q.q.. N = (A-5)l <i> <i> l l <i>
which can be solved for q.. v as a function of q. and integrated from
<i> l
to q. = S/(2a - 1):
2
Area of C: \ j { (l-3a)(l-4a)-a
2/l-4a[asinh( 3oc~j_)+asinh(—-~) } } (A-6)
(l-2a) (l-4a) 2a/-a 2/-a
The coefficient of dispersion can then be written as
, v (l-2a)(l-4q)
2 (l-a)a 2
(l-3a)(a -3a+l)(a(l-4a)(5a-2)+a (l-a)/l-4a[asinh a
_
+ asinh
-^1}
2a/ -a 2/ -a
Note that 8 has disappeared from the above equation. In proving that
o*(a) is monotone increasing, we need only show that a' (a) < for
a < 0. In applying the quotient rule to finding a '(a) from eq. (A-7),
we need only be concerned with the sign of the numerator of the
resulting expression since the denominator will be the square of the
denominator of eq. (A-7). It is easy to evaluate the sign of the
numerator of the resulting derivative with the exception of a term
• u
/
3q-l N . , , 1___, /l-4q , Q .asmh( —) + asmh(
—
—) +
,
(A-8)
2a/-a 2/-a
whose sign at first appears to be ambiguous. The arguments of the
inverse hyperbolic sines are positive, thus they too are positive.
The last term is negative since a < 0. However, eq. (A-8) turns out
-A3-
to be negative since the limit of eq. (A-8) as a goes to -• is zero,
and the derivative of eq. (A-8) is negative for a < 0. This permits
the deduction that a' (a) < for a < 0. Further,
lim cr(a) =
-| . (A-9)
This is obtained by applying l'Hopital's rule several times to parts
of the reciprocal of eq. (A-7).
Q.E.D.
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Figure 3: Output for the duopolists
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Figure 4: Tax-rates for the duopolists.



